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This paper reports on a general-equilibrium-  For the targeted antipoverty programs, the
based social policy model for Cote d'Ivoire - authors show that when general equilibrium
its structure, the data used in its implementation,  effects are taken into account, it is impossible
and its application to the analysis of tax inci-  under a budget-neutral targeting program to
dence and antipoverty programs.  completely eliminate poverty (as traditional
analysis would suggest). At the same time, small
The authors emphasize that special features  transfers generally have a greater relative effect
of the Ivorian economy and tax system are  than larger targeting programs. This has several
central to any assessment of the distribution  policy implications for the cost of the programs
consequences of tax policies and other social  and the choice of groups that should benefit. As
policies in COte  d'Ivoire.  Because the bases of  in the tax incidence analysis, the authors show
individual taxes tend to be narrow - the inci-  that such domestic features as interhousehold
dence effects by socioeconomic group are  transfers play an important role in determining
pronounced, while those by income range are  the final outcome of the targeting program.
milder. Urban employees are largely affected by
income taxes (through withholding). Export food  The model should be seen as an instrument
croppers are affected by the stabilization fund  that helps in developing capacitas  for
and export taxes. In addition, large  macroanalysis and in generally enhancing the
interhousehold transfers in COte  d'lvoire give  economic debate. It should be transparent
incidence profiles that differ from conventional  enough to enable policymakers to use it effi-
analysis. The reason: the taxes seemingly bome  ciently - and at the same time answer some key
by one household group have second-round  questions of relevance to the Ivorian economy.
effects on other household groups through
changed interhousehold transfers.
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work  under  way  in  the Bank.  An  objective  of the  series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings, interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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paper.I.  INTRODUCTION  AND OBJECTIVES
This  paper describes a  general equilibrium based social policy model for Cote
d'Ivoire whose  aim is both to facilitate  analyses  of a wide range of social  policy options, any
of which  could conceivably  be pursued in Cote d'Ivoire over the next five or ten years, and
to provide a basis for further model development  to cover explicit monetary, macro, and
stabilization  issues which are central to current Ivorian policy debate. As it now stands, the
model is a  classical real side general equilibrium model in the public finance tradition
(Harberger 1962, Shoven and Whailey 1984),  modified  to capture such key Ivorian features
as domestic  price stabilization  schemes, large interhousehold  transfers, the informal sector,
and other features.  '  The model allows for detailed  analysis of social policy options such as
impacts of anti-poverty  programs, but embeds such analyses within a general equilibrium
framework.  This  also captures relative price  effects, financing implications, resource
allocation and other economy-wide  effects missing in existing work on targeting policies.
Hence the description  of our social policy model as general equilibrium-based.
The model  captures some of the more major interactions  between key sectors of the
Ivorian economy: modem and traditional, urban and rural, agricultural and manufacturing,
importing and exporting, formal and informal, and others.  Its strength is its capability to
trace through  the economy-wide  implications  of any proposed  policy  changes. It can identify
which sectors may expand and which contract; which groups in the economy may gain or
lose; and assess impacts  on trade patterns and inter-sectoral  resource transfers.  Its weakness
Plans exist to extend the model tz allow evaluation of Ivorian participation  in the Franc
Zone, deficit reduction  and stabilization  programs, and other issues not captured by the present
structure.
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is its traditional  equilibrium  structure which  assumes competitive  behavior, incorporates no
explicit treatment of time and in its present form, contains no monetary features and has
balanced government and external sector accounts. 2 It  uses data  from a  1986 Social
Accounting  Matrix (SAM) constructed  by a modelling  group in CMte  d'Ivoire; part of the
newly created macro-economic  unit at the Ecole Nationale de Statistique et d'Economie
Appliquee (ENSEA).3
In the text, we describe the model structure, 4 and illustrate its application  to social
policy design in Cote d'Ivoire by presenting model-based  analyses of tax incidence  in CMte
d'Ivoire and the design of anti-poverty programs.  For policy changes in each of these
categories, we solve the model for a range of possible  policy changes, and compare model
results with base-case data.  These results show both how key features of  the Ivorian
economy  (such as large interhousehold  transfers) need to be taken into account in analyzing
the impacts of possible new social policies in C6te d'Ivoire, and how important general
equilibrium  considerations  can be in such analyses.
The paper is divided into 5  sections. Section  2 describes  the model  in detail; Sections
3 and 4 present examples of its application, first with analysis of tax incidence in C6te
d'Ivoire,  and  second with evaluation of  anti-poverty programs.  A concluding section
summarizes work thus far with the model, and plots a path for the future.
2  Hence the impacts of international debt renegotiations  for C6te d'Ivoire could not be
adequately addressed through the present modelling  framework.
3  For more details on the institutional  setting within which the model has been developed
and is planned to operate in the future, see Wahba and Whalley (1992).
4 Appendices  A and B present a formal description of the model and the input data used
(including  elasticity and other parameter values).3
II.  GENERAL  EQUILIBRIUM-BASED  SOCIAL  POLICY  ANALYSIS  FOR COTE
D'IVOIRE
The CBte d'Ivoire Economy
C6te d'Ivoire is a mid-sized  African  economy  with a population  of 12 million  (1989)
and income  per capita of approximately  $740 (1990). It is one of the key member  countries
of West African Monetary Union (Union mondtaire  Ouest-Africaine-UMOA) 5 that share a
common freely convertible  currency.  C6te d'Ivoire accounts for 41 percent of the Union's
GDP and 23 percent of the total population.
In the first two decades following independence,  the Ivorian economy experienced
strong economic  performance, with rapid growth in both output and exports.  The average
annual growth rate of GDP for the period 1965-1973  was 8.9 percent.  But in the second
half of the seventies, a series of shocks  disrupted the economy. These began with a coffee
price boom in  1976, following which revenues accruing to the government through the
Stabilization  Fund that regulates domestic coffee and cocoa prices received by producers
were committed to  finance a  major investment program.  Although world prices  fell
immediately after 1976, the government continued its investment program into the early
1980s in the belief that the fall in world prices was temporary.  But commodity prices
continued  to fall sharply, growth in the Ivorian economy  slowed (and turned negative), and
debt service became a major problem.  By 1981, the budget  deficit had reached 12 percent
of GDP (Chamley (1991)), by 1986  the terms of trade had fallen by 40 percent, and by 1990
3 The UMOA includes six other countries, Benin, Burkina-Faso,  Mali, Niger, Senegal and
Togo.4
the country's external and internal  outstanding  debt had reached 125  percent and 37 percent
of GDP respectively.
A series of structural adjustment  programs in response to these developments  were
implemented  by the government, beginning in the early  1980s.  Although there was an
improvement  in performance  between 1984-1986,  due to a rise in world prices of coffee and
cocoa and an appreciation of the dollar, snce  1986 earlier decijnes in real output have
continued, with real GDP falling by more than a quarter.  Along with this deterioration  in
economic performance, government revenues have also s.A 4 "Uily fallen as a percentage of
GDP from 31.1 percent in 1984 to 23.6 percent in 1990, with this fall mainly reflecting
declining Commodity Stabilization  Fund revenues.  Coffee and cocoa are  no longer the
majority share in exports, although in  1990 they still accounted for 35 percent of total
exports of goods and services.
Applied General Equilibrium Models
The general equilibrium-based  social policy model  we present here is primarily  aimed
at aiding assessment  of the social consequences  of the adjustment  programs pursued in C6te
d'lvoire since 1981.  It captures relative product- and factor-price movements, and shows
how resources reallocate as policies  change.  Because the model utilizes  a base-year Social
Accounting  Matrices (SAM), which details how incomes generated by production activities
are mapped  across to households  and how expenditure  decisions  by households  are allocated5
to  sectors, the model explicitly focuses on incomes, their distribution, and how social
policies affect the outcome  of the economy. 6
In general equilibrium  models, producing  units are represented  as purchasing inputs
from households, and generating value-added  by using them in the production process.  In
return for supplying factor services, households  receive income payments, which are, in
turn, allocated to savings and consumption. These production and consumption decisions
yield supplies and demands in the various product and factor markets.  These are made
mutually consistent through relative price adjustments, which,  unless some rigidity is
assumed to exist, in equilibrium  yield zero excess demands in all markets.  Demands and
supplies  of agents thus depend  on relative prices.  Such models also usually  explicitly treat
the external sector, and hence can also be used to analyze the social impacts of alternative
trade policies.
By changing internal social policies (fiscal and expenditure policies, agricultural
pricing policies, or labor migration  policies, for example)  or external sector policies (such
as export tax policies, import policies and exchange  rate policies), the government in these
models can change the behavior  of agents. These changes, in turn, will have other general
equilibrium  effects including  on prices. These models, therefore, seek to trace the operation
of  the underlying real economy.  They yield predictions of what is likely to  happen to
relative product and factor prices if the assumptions  of the model, or if policy instruments
6  For a summary of the main features of other numerical general equilibrium models to
which ours is closely related, see Dervis et al. (1982) Ch.5.  See Robinson (1989) for a more
recent review of models applied to developing  countries.  Decaluwe and Martens (1988), and
Devarajan (1986) provide helpful bibliographies  of the area, and Shoven and Whalley (1984,
1992) an expository  introduction to tax-based  general equilibrium models.6
change. They represent  an attempt at empirical  application  of orthodox real-economy  micro
theory, typically  describing  barter rather than monetized  representations  of actual economies.
The  present  general equilibrium model  has  two  clearly  apparent  and  major
weaknesses  in its application  to CMte  d'Ivoire.  The first is that it does not capture macro
imbalances;  government  budget  deficits,  trade deficits, unemployment,  and especially  the key
monetary components of such imbalances. The second is that it only traces through the
effects of social policy interventions  on markets, and does not explicitly treat effects on
infrastructure and wider social development,  including education  and health care.
The first weakness  is a reflection  of the feature that most existing numerical general
equilibrium  models use fairly simple theoretical  structures. In following  a classical relative
price/barter form, the present model is not able to trace through the effects of macro-
economic  policies, especially  when such policy interventions  occur through the operation of
monetary variables.'  The price level has no real effects, and commodity  prices are simply
expressed in terms of some numeraire.
'  Bourguignon,  Branson, and de Melo (1989), and Bourguignon,  de Melo and Suwa (1991)
have made recent contributions to this area.  Their modification of the traditional general
equilibrium approach  involves the  addition of  a  macro-economic model to  the  general
equilibrium framework, in which the macro-economic  sub-model  yields the level of aggregate
demand in the economy  (through a variant of an IS/LM system), whilst the general equilibrium
sub-model  computes the real-side  economy, yielding  aggregate  supply. The price level is given
by the relation between  aggregate  supply  and demand. Their macro-model  contains  asset-market
equilibrium  conditions,  which determine  a vector of rates of return. These in turn influence  the
level of aggregate  demand. Whether these models  provide an empirically  convincing  description
of how macro-economic  changes influence  the real economy in developing  countries is a topic
of some  discussion. See also the special issue of World  Development,  Vol.  19, No.  11, November
1991.7
The second weakness  of the model, especially important for the analysis of social
adjustments accompanying policy changes, is its inability to  capture the full effects of
infrastructural  changes.  If structural adjustment involves cuts in government  expenditures
on education, health or public works, there will be income losses for those employed in
sectors which previously benefitted from these expenditures (i.e.,  teachers, doctors, road
construction firms, and so on).  Expenditure  cuts, however, also have indirect effects on
households  who also previously benefitted  from infrastructural  services.  Cuts in education
expenditures not only reduce the incomes of those employed in the education sector, they
also adversely affect the education of  those who benefitted from the services, reducing
current levels of household  welfare, and future levels of income. The same can be said for
cuts in  health expenditure.  Reductions in  other infrastructural services,  such as  road
construction,  have similar effects. Households  who as a result cannot  gain access to markets
and infrastructure inputs will experience declines in output, income, and welfare and these
effects of infrastructure  changes are not easily captured  in the numerical  general equilibrium
model we use.
Thus, the direct-income  effects  of social policy-related  expenditure  cuts are captured
in the present model with the resulting contraction  in sectoral demands 8. To analyze these
effects, cuts in government expenditure  items need to be translated  into changed sectoral
8  A  SAM-based analysis can  provide  similar assessments, although without general
equilibrium  effects captured.  Thorbecke et al. (1990), for instance, trace the primary-income
distribution effects of alternative fiscal policies in Indonesia using a fix-price SAM multiplier
model.8
demands, so that they can provide readable input into the model (via the SAM).  But,
indirect effects through  reduced provision of social services are not captured. 9
Model Structure
The model  of C6te d'Ivoire contains 15 sectors, and has 7 tradable sectors and 8 non-
tradable sectors. Its distinguishing  feature, relative to earlier general equilibrium models  of
C6te d'Ivoire'°, is an explicit focus on social dimensions  of economic policies; impacts of
policy changes on  socio-economic  groups, analysis of anti-poverty programs, incidence
effects of tax subsidy programs.  The model also separately  identifies formal and informal
sectors of the economy; a departure frohn  previous work."
Tradable sectors in the model include: the agricultural  sector, the traditional export
3ector,  the  non-traditional export  sector,  the  first  transformation sector  (formal and
informal), and the manufacturing  (formal and informal) industries.  Non-tradable sectors
include: gas and electricity,  construction  (formal  and informal),  transport, financial  services,
other services (formal and informal) and government services.  Given the importance of
agriculture in  C6te d'Ivoire,  considerable detail is  incorporated in  the  model for the
agricultural sector.  We disaggregate this sector into the food crop sector, the traditional
export sector (which include coffee and cocoa) and the non-traditional  sector (e.g. sugar,
9 For more details see Demery, Noel and Wahba (1991).
'° The first model of this type for C6te d'Ivoire was used for the preparation of the third
Structural Adjustment  Loan.  See Michel  and Noel (1984a,b) and World Bank (1987).
" For more details on the informal sector, see Chia et al. (1991a). Lambert, Schneider  and
Suwa (1991) also model the informal sector although  it is represented  as one sector only.9
palm oil, rubber).  Within the tradable goods sector, there are four importable and three
exportable sectors.  The exportable sector covers all goods that are suppliea to both the
domestic market and as exports.
Production  Structure
Production  functions  in the model  are of the nested constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) form, and are constant returns to scale, although  two special cases of the CES form,
Leontief  (fixed coefficient)  and Cobb-Douglas,  are also used.  Both traded and non-traded
goods are treated as produced by each of these sectors using both primary factors and
intermediate inputs.  Primary factors include labor,  capital, and sector-specific factor.
Intermediate inputs are a composite of comparable domestically produced and imported
goods (domestic  and foreign machinery, for instance).
Figure 1.  Nesting Structure  of Production  Functions  used in Each Sector
Q  Output  (Leontief  in VA,A)
Value-added  funcdon  (CES)  VA  A, ...  A, 5 Intermediate  goods
if  \  it  \  composites
L  K  AD..AM10
Demand Structure
Seven household  types grouped  by socio-economic  status are identified in the model.
These are households  in the traditional export sectors (MEXP), households in Savannah
(MSAV), households in  agricultural sectors other  than  in  the  Savannah (MVIVA),
government  households  (MADP),  households  in the formal  sector (MFOR), independent  and
self-employed  households  in the informal  sector (MIND),  and inactive households  (MINAC).
Table I lists the seven groups, along with data showing the key characteristics of each
group, including  shares  of population,  per household  income,  savings rates, and net transfers
paid or received.  Classifying households  in this way allows the model to identify the
impacts of alternative social policies on targeted segments of  the economy in ways not
possible if households  are classified by income level.'2
12 The disaggregation  of the household  sector should be general enough to cover a series of
issues other than those examined  in the paper.  At the same time, it should be representative  of
the  various groups adopted to  obtain a  distinct inter-household  distribution while having
homogenous  groups.  See Dervis, de Melo and Robinson  (1989) and The World Bank (1990a).11
Table 1
Characteristics of Household  Groups  Identified






Income  to other  house-
Savings  tax  households  holds
Poverty"  Per capita  as %  as % of  (as % of  (as % of
Household  Population  index  income  of total  total  total  total
Types  Share  (%)  (CFA)  income  income  income)  income)
Food croppers in
Savannah  (MSAV)  11.03  63.68  132,972  0.33  0.60  0.0  24.00
Export croppers
(MEXP)  20.28  44.04  173,722  0.57  0.50  15.60  0.00
Small businesses
(MIND)  21.48  46.81  187,600  0.91  1.00  0.00  3.50
Other food croppers
(MVIVA)  12.77  34.46  202,176  0.37  0.55  32.75  0.00
Inactive (MINAC)  15.10  37.07  220,629  0.75  2.81  0.00  67.86
Govemment  employees
(MADP)  11.80  8.69  423,085  0.89  5.86  11.24  0.00
Households  in formal
sector (MFOR)  7.60  1.79  622,807  0.80  2.48  16.96  0.00
a  Percentage  of households  in the group below the poverty line, based on a poverty line
of CFA 140,000 (or 50 percent of mean income for 1986).
Final demands for each of the household groups are generated by maximizing a
nested constant elasticity of  substitution (CES) utility function subject to the household
budget constraint. Figure 2 provides  a schematic  representation  of the nesting  structure used
in the household  utility function. In the top level of the nest, the utility function is specified12
as Cobb-Douglas  defined  over composites  of domestic  and comparable  imported  consumption
goods.  In the lower nest, imports and comparable  domestically  produced goods are CES
functions  with different  elasticities  of substitution  for each product.  Because we use a static
single-period  model, the shares of household  post-tax income devoted to consumption and
savings are assumed to be constant. All household  savings are treated as being paid into a
savings pool, which finances domestic  investment.
Figure 2:  Nesting structure  used in household utility function
U,  Utility
A  t 
GI,.....  G,5  Composite  goods
GD,  GM,  GD, 5 GM, 5 Comparable  domestic
and foreign goods
Each household  is endowed with a fixed amount of both mobile (labor and capital)
and sector-specific  factors, has preferences (which differ by household), and consumes the
15 consumer  goods identified  in the model. Besides  income from endowments, households
also receive transfers from the government,  as well as transfers from abroad and from other13
households.  As Table 1 indicates, interhousehold transfers" 3 play a  major role in  the
economy, unlike in  comparable models of  developing countries, resulting in  a  strong
rural-urban income linkage in this model.
Treatment  of the Labor Market
The model includes a treatment of the labor market which is more detailed than in
other general equilibrium models  of developing  countries.  To capture C6te d'Ivoire labor
market segmentation, labor is disaggregated into three types:  agricultural, skilled and
unskilled labor.  Skilled and unskilled labor move freely across sectors, while agricultural
labor is sector specific.  In the agricultural  sector, there are two levels of nesting. The top
nest is a CES function of skilled and composite labor.  At the lower level of nesting,
composite  labor is a function  of unskilled  labor and agricultural  labor. In the non-agricultural
formal sectors, labor is a nested CES function  only of skilled labor and unskilled  labor. The
informal sector uses only unskilled labor.  Treating unskilled  and skilled labor as mobile
across sectors allows us to capture movements  of labor between formal  and informal sectors,
as well as between agricultural and non-agricultural  sectors (i.e. rural-urban migration).' 4
13 These are estimated using household  data on financial savings to which regression
estimates on acquisition of financial  assets are applied.  The difference is taken to be net
transfers, which are constrained to sum to zero across all household  groups.  See Chia et al.
(1991) for more detail on the data and to evaluate interhousehold  transfers.  Pyatt and Round
(1984) adopt a similar treatment in estimating interhousehold  transfers for Malaysia.
14  For a more detailed description  of the resulting  treatment of labour income in the model
data set, see Chia et al. (1991).14
Capital is treated in the model as reflecting both a fixed sector-specifilc  component,
and a component  which is mobile  across sectors. This treatment  is adopted, in part, to avoid
any problems  with specialization,  given the internationally  homogeneous  good treatment on
the export side (see below).  Varying the share parameters on fixed and mobile factors in
production can also be used to change implied output supply elasticities.
Government  Sector
The government sector in the model provides government services, such as public
administration,  economic  and social  planning, defence  and security services. These services
are in reality provided to the public either freely or with a small user fee.  In the model  they
are  decided upon through government utility maximization  defined over goods used to
provide government services; i.e.,  there  is no  mechanism for households to  articulate
demands for public goods.  In addition to real goods and services used by government to
provide public services, public sector transfers to  households for education and  other
objectives  also enter the model.  All of these government  activities are financed by taxes.
Finally, the government  sector includes  the Caisse de Perequation  (Marketing  Board for rice)
and the Caisse de Stabilisation  (Marketing  Board for cocoa, coffee and cotton  and the ETAT
de education), whose activities are modelled  as taxes or subsidies  depending upon whether
on a net basis revenues are raised.15
Extemnal  Sector
As discussed  in Whalley  and Yeung  (1984),  the treatment  adopted  for the external
sector  in general  equilibrium  models  is important  because  it can significantly  affect  results.
The term 'external  sector  closure  rule' refers  to the assumptions  made  on the export  demand
and import  supply  behavior  of the foreign  entity  (rest  of the world)  with whom  the country
being modelled  is assumed  to trade.
There  are two  popular  variants  of external  sector  closure  used  in the literature. The
first is the small  open price taking  economy  treatment  (SOPTE)  with homogeneous  goods.
In this model  variant,  import  and export  prices  are taken  as given,  and hence  there are no
endogenous  changes  in the terms  of trade  as policies  or other  parameters  in the home  country
change. Commodity  trade  imbalances  are balanced  by exogenously  specified  capital  inflows
in the current  account.
This small open price-taking  economy  (SOPTE)  formulation  provides a simple
description  of the rest of the world. Interdependence  with  the rest of the world  is reflected
in the prices  faced  by the smaller  economy. With no insulation  from the world  economy,
world prices determine  domestic  factor prices and production. The implication  of this
assumption  is that there are no terms-of-trade  effects  which  affect model  welfare  results.
However,  because  only net trades  enter the SOPTE  implementation,  it cannot  account  for
cross-hauling  found  in the international  trade statistics. Also, because  it explicitly  assumes
infinite  elasticity  of foreign  excess  demand  functions,  sensitivity  analysis  on trade  elasticity
parameters  is not possible. The SOPTE  assumption  also becomes  key to how the model
evaluates  the impacts  of policy  changes. For example,  given  CBte  d'Ivoire's large  position16
in global  cocoa production, this may be an inappropriate,  even if a convenient, assumption.
The second external sector closure rule widely used is one based on the so-called
Armington (1969) assumption.  Under this formulation, imports are treated as imperfect
substitutes  for domestically  produced  goods.  The supply of imports is often assumed to be
perfectly elastic at fixed world prices in this formulation;  i.e., the country is a "price taker"
on imports, with the country being a "price maker" for exports with the foreign demand
function for the country's exports being downward sloping.' 5 The Armington assumption,
therefore, allows for two-way trade as  well as price differences between imported and
domestically  produced goods.  In this formulation, agents are thought of as demanding  an
aggregate (or composite)  of imported and domestic goods.  The composition of this good
depends on the relative prices of imported and domestic goods, and on the elasticity of
substitution  in preferences  or production specified.
The external sector closure rule we used in the social policy model is a hybrid of the
two standard approaches designed to give a convenient and simple treatment, while giving
more flexibility  than a simple SOPTE treatment. We use the Armington (1969)  assumption
that imports  are imperfect  substitutes  with domestically  produced  goods, and so the domestic-
import composite  enters the intermediate  demand and household  final demands.  However,
we depart from the  "price taker" on  imports and  "price maker" on  export treatment
15  This external sector closure rule was used for example in a model of Turkey (Dervis and
Robinson 1982), Cameroon (Benjamin  and Devarajan 1985). Although  as Whalley and Yeung
(1984) implicitly  point out, in an N good world the restriction of Wairas Law on the foreign
country excess demands would imply a cross-equation  restriction between import supply and
export demands such that this treatment could not apply to all members of the two subgroups
of goods.17
described above in that we assume small open price taking behavior on both imports and
exports.
Counterfactual policy analyses can be performed with the model for changes in a
variety  of social  policies, including  income  and value-added  tax changes, targeting  programs,
and  changes in  government expenditures (on education, for  instance), domestic price
controls, export policies, and others. When used in counterfactual  mode, the model is solved
using the MPS-GE software package developed by  Rutherford (1988).  This  software
package explicitly incorporates the optimizing behavior of consumers and firms, together
with  the  activities  of  central  and  provincial government agencies.  The  numerical
specification  of behavioral relationships  and policy parameters in the model are generated
using the calibration  techniques  set out in Mansur and Whalley (1984) using the 1986 SAM
referred to above.
The  MPS-GE software  used  captures four  sets  of  economic constraints (for
commodities,  consumers, producers and auxiliary constraints), and two classes of functions
(utility and production functions).  Agents are  assumed to  behave competitively; i.e.,
consumers allocate their incomes to maximize utility from consumption, producers adjust
their production  plans to maximize  profit, and both groups take market prices as given. The
number and types  of agents and commodities,  together with the characteristics  of production
and utility functions,  constitutes  the input formulation  of the model for the purposes of MPS-
GE.  Primal and dual constraints require that supply satisfies demand and that no sector
earns excess profit; MPS-GE uses these conditions to  compute equilibrium prices and
quantities.18
Tax Structure
Export taxes arn Caisse  de Stabilisation  (STAB)
C6te d'Ivoire levies export taxes on the traditional  and non-traditional  exports, which
are both captured in the model, even though  these have been sharply reduced in recent years.
The Caisse de Stabilization,  or STAB, covers traditional  exports (cocoa, coffee and
cotton) and in practice its operations are designed to dampen the effects of fluctuation of
world prices on domestic producers so as to  stabilize their incomes.  This institutional
arrangement is modelled  such that when prices for these products are higher than domestic
prices, the difference received by the STAB is transferred to the government  as a source of
revenue. When the world price is lower than the domestic price, then the sectors involved
receive subsidies from the STAB.
Income taxes
The model also captures income taxes in Cote d'Ivoire,  although in practice they
largely affect higher income urban workers and government employees.  In the model,
household  h with income Y"  is taxed at the marginal  rate of Th. Marginal rates increase with
income.  The income tax paid by household  h (PI1")  is thus:
3 
PIT' = x,,  E ik  (1)
The total income tax revenue received by the government from the household  sectors (R h)
is:19
R" =  PIT"  (2)
',..,
Taxes on goods and the production value-added  tax
Taxes at rate Ti on household  purchases of products also enter the model, reflecting
the operation of excises and other commodity-specific  taxes.  Total revenues from these
sources, R I, is given by
15  7  3
RC =  E  E .pjGP  (3)
The CMte  d'Ivoire value-added  tax is modelled  as applying  at rates t, directly to value-added
originating in each sector.  Revenues  raised from this tax, R P,  are
15
RP = E  tjVAj  (4)
j-1  j
The total tax revenue collected by the govemment  is thus:
R T = R " + R  C  + R P  (5)
Besides  tax revenues (RT),  total government  revenue (R) also includes revenues  collected by
the Caisse de Perequation  and tne Caisse de Stabilisation.20
The government spends part of the  revenue raised in the  model on  goods and
services, with the remainder either redistributed back to  households as transfers (r)  or
retained as government  savings (S  8).  As with the private sector households  in the model,
the government has a constant savings share and a utility defined over goods, including
inputs into publicly provided services.  From the government utility function, we can
calculate the  corresponding expenditure function, and  so  in  counterfactual equilibria
evaluated with the model, we can determine the revenue required to maintain  government
utility at the benchmark level.  Shoven and Whalley (1977) discuss various definitions of
equal tax yield which can be used in implementing  such an approach.  Ballard, Fullerton,
Shoven and Whalley (1985) further report on different types of replacement  rules used to
maintain the government  utility at the benchmark  level.21
III.  ANALYZING  THE INCIDENCE  OF TAXES IN COTE D'IVOIRE
Tax Structure  in C6te d'lvoire
One example  of the application  of the social policy  model  presented  in earlier sections
is to the analysis of tax incidence  in Cote d'Ivoire.  The 'vorian tax system has undergone
substantial  change in the last three decades. Initially limited in revenue raising capabilities,
both government  expenditures  and revenues grew in the 1960s  as commodity  exports grew,
because  of the preeminent  role of trade taxes (both export taxes and import duties) in the tax
system.  But as  small scale  manufacturing  developed, and with  urbanization, and the
expansion of  government employment, personal income taxes (largely on  government
employees)  and corporate taxes (heavily  on foreign owned  subsidiaries)  grew. Indirect taxes
also  became  more important, and  today  a  manufacturing level  VAT" 6 now operates
alongside specific excise taxes on gasoline, tobacco, liquor, and other items as a major
government revenue source.  Tax incidence in C6te d'Ivoire is, therefore, changing over
time.
In general, the Ivorian economy has had an average tax revenue as percentage of
GDP greater than the average  for Sub-Saharan  African  economies  (Shalizi  and Squire 1988).
Table 4 reports the changing revenue importance  of taxes in Cote d'Ivoire.  The tax system
has traditionally been strongly biased against exports, with price  stabilization policies
operating, against the traditional  export sectors  especially  in the mid-1980s. In 1986, export
taxes and contributions  to the Caisse de Stabilisation  provided almost 17 percent total tax
16  See the more detailed discussion  of the VAT in C6te d'Ivoire in Heian and Monson
(1987).22
collected. Changes  aimed at reducing  the burden of taxes borne by the export sector have
been a major feature of recent reforms. Falling world cocoa prices have also meant that in
recent years the Stabilization  Fund has subsidized  rather than taxed exports.
The present tax system is then a hybrid, seemingly  including  all the major elements
of a typical  tax system (income,  corporate, sales, etc.), while maintaining  features commonly
found in  other developing economy tax  systems'.  As  Table 2  indicates, there is  a
continuing heavy dependence on import duties."8  Second, the base of each of the major
taxes remains narrow (income  tax on government  employees;  corporate tax heavily focused
on foreign subsidiaries, VAT restricted to manufacturing  level, etc.), which leads to the
relatively high tax costs for certain sectors of the economy.' 9 Finally, the tax system has
been operating in  a  rapidly changing macro-environment,  with large debt service and
domestic government arrears, further complicating  tax incidence  analyses.
"7  See Shah  and Whalley  (1991)
18  Export taxes have been sharply reduced throughout the late 1980s.
'9 In 1986, 47 percent of total production tax revenues came from the service sector only.23
Table 2
Composition of Tax Revenues in CMte  d'lvoire for Selected Years
(percentage)a
1980  1983  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991c
(% of Total Revenue):
Production taxes  25.6  29.7  27.7  30.7  31.9  33.9  38.5  29.7
Import duties  32.0  30.6  35.9  33.6  34.3  37.8  32.7  43.2
Export taxes  10.5  8.7  11.9  11.8  8.6  3.7  1.5  1.7
Income taxes  32.0  31.1  24.5  24.0  25.2  24.7  27.4  25.3
Tax Revenue as % of  23.0  22.2  20.4  21.5  20.3  19.1  19.4  19.9
GDP  _  _  _  _  _  _
a:  Does not always add to 100 due to rounding
e:  Estimates
Sources:  World Bank (1987, 1991);  Chamley (1991)
Several features of  the  Ivorian economy and  the tax  system important for tax
incidence analysis are especially worth noting.  One is  large interhousehold transfers,
typically  operating between urban households  and rural family members. These imply that
taxes usually thought of as being borne by one group of households  may have part of their
burden transmitted  to other households  through reduced transfers.  A second is the narrow
base of key taxes, which implies more specificity in tax incidence than in countries with
broadly based taxes, since taxes primarily affect more narrowly defined socio-economic
groups (government  employees, cocoa farmers, etc.), rather than income ranges.  A third
is the economy's relationship  to the exernal sector, and the tax implications  that follow; with24
a significant  portion of foreign exchange  earnings raised through trade taxes, and in such a
protected  environment, trade arrangements  have large incidence  effects.
Incidence of Taxes
As Musgrave (1957) long ago pointed out, there is no unique way to execute tax
incidence analyses since the counterfactual  needs to be carefully specified.  He suggested
three different tax incidence  concepts:  "absolute", "differential"  and "budget" incidence.
Under absolute tax incidence  analysis, the distributional  impacts  of a tax are examined  while
keeping  public expenditures  unchanged  with foregone  revenues left unfinanced  (i.e., neither
by expenditure  cuts or tax increases). Under  budget incidence,  equal reductions  in taxes and
exptnditures are considered. In differential incidence  analysis, the most widely used of his
concepts, the tax being examined is replaced by a yield preserving neutral alternative tax.
The counterfactual analyses we perform with our model use this differential incidence
concept, as in Shoven  and Whalley  (1977). We substitute  a yield neutral broadly  based sales
tax for each major component of the tax system such that total real government revenues
(and hence expenditures)  are kept constant in each of our analyses. 20
Table 3 reports tax incidence  results for various components  of the Cote d'Ivoire tax
system using 1986 data and the central case specification  of our model.  We analyze the
effects on the seven household  groups in the model, who we rank from richest to poorest. 2'
20 See de Wulf (1975) for a review of tax incidence  analysis in developing  countries.
21  Note, however, that this classification  from poor to rich is not identical to what would
be used in a  more traditional income range tax incidence analysis, since the use of socio-
economic  criteria rather than income deciles mean that the poor and the rich households  in the25
For each household group we report welfare impacts by household for the tax change
involved, in terms of Hicksian  equivalent  variations  expressed as a fraction of the base case
gross income of the household group.  A positive number indicates a gain from the tax
change, and a negative number a loss from the change from the present tax regime to one
containing  an equal yield broadly based sales tax in place of the replaced tax.
Table 3
Incidence Impacts  of Ivorian Taxes from the Central Case Model Variant
(Hicksian  EVs expressed  as percentage  of benchmark  gross income)
Introducing  an equal yield, non-distorting  consumption  tax to replace:
Personal  Production  Export  Import  Stabilization
Households  income tax  taxes  tax  duties  Fund  Subsidies
1  2  3  4  5  6
Poor  Food croppers
in Savannah  -0.65  -6.44  0.25  0.67  0.46  -3.58
Export croppers  -0.26  4.51  1.12  24.11  27.87  0.86
Small businesses  -1.58  1.24  0.09  -0.18  -1.60  0.22
Other food
croppers  -1.52  -7.93  0.04  0.16  -3.03  -3.20
Inactive  2.66  -2.53  0.42  1.12  5.35  -2.79
Government
cmployees  3.44  2.59  -0.61  -8.50  -10.33  1.52
Households  in
R  formal  sector  -0.63  3.48  -0.38  -10.8  -8.73  1.73
R ich  I__  _  _  _  _  _  __  __  __  I__I_I_I
economy  are distributed  across all of these groups. The ranldng in Table 5 is only by the mean
incomes of each group.26
Personal Income Taxes
Our results in Table 3 generally produce a progressive incidence profile for the
Ivorian income tax, but not for the top income group in the formal sector where use of tax
loopholes  and avoidance  changes  the incidence  profile.  Other developing  country incidence
studies using partial equilibrium  generally show personal income taxes to be progressive,
since these taxes  are assumed to be borne by those individuals  who pay them. These studies
ignore complications  stemming from effects on labor migration (urban-rural, for instance)
or tax evasion, 22 and interhousehold  transfers which (as will be shown) can alter the tax
incidence  profile.
Production (sales, value-added  and excise) Taxes
Column 2 in Table 3 presents incidence results for production taxes, finding their
incidence profile to be neither progressive nor regressive, with the  major effects from
removing these taxes operating against the non-export  agricultural sector (food croppers in
the Savannah,  and other food  croppers), and with exporters  and urban dwellers  gaining from
the removal of the tax (and its replacement  by a yield-neutral alternative).  A series of
factors account for these results.  Food croppers are  largely tax free in tne base-case
situation, and are adversely affected  by the broadly  based equal-yield  tax which they, along
with all households,  pay.  Urban dwellers  are heavy payers of the manufacturing  level VAT
in CMte  d'Ivoire.
22  For anecdotal evidence on tax evasion see for example Klitgaard (1988).27
These results differ from other incidence  analyses of production taxes in developing
countries  which generally  reflect an assumption  of full forward shifting. Because  these taxes
are usually simply  allocated  among income ranges using data on consumption  expenditures,
such  studies usually find that these taxes are  regressive while also  arguing that this
regressivity could be reduced through the use of differential tax rates by commodity, and
excises on "luxury goods".
Here, the incidence profile is a mix of negative and positive effects by household
group.  Larger redistribution  occurs than with the income tax because of the large relative
price effects stemming from the removal of selective sales taxes, including the VAT and
border tax adjustments.
Export Taxes
Incidence  results in Table 3 for export taxes show  a pro-poor  effect from the removal
of export taxes in CMte  d'Ivoire, suggesting  that these taxes are regressive. Indeed, current
tax reforms aim at gradually eliminating these taxes.  In part, these incidence  effects from
the model reflect the impact  of the replacement  taxes in also applying to urban households
consuming imported products.  These results are in contrast to those from other incidence
studies, which assume that  he incidence of export taxes falls exclusively on producer-
exporter groups, and which yield a progressive incidence  pattern, since these groups are in
the higher income ranges.  One study consistent with our findings is that of Sri-Lanka by
Jayasundera  (1986) who also considers implicit subsidies  to domestic  consumers  associated28
with export taxes on tea and rubber, and found that these have pro-poor incidence effects.
Import Duties
Results in Table 3 also suggest  that incidence  effects  of import duties in C6te d'Ivoire
are large, with mixed effects across household  groups ranked by income range.  Removing
duties positively and substantially  affects agricultural export sectors, since import duties
operate akin to export taxes.  Since prces of domestic import competing  products increase
behind the tariff wall, removing tariffs raises domestic prices of exportables relative to
import substitutes, which  affects returns to fixed factors  in export sectors. Subsistence  food
croppers selling  food products  to the domestic  and urban market suffer, as agricultural  wages
are bid up by agricultural  exporters. Government  workers lose since they must pay the new
replacement  tax.  In other developing country incidence studies, import duties are usually
assumed to be fully forward shifted to consumers  of imported  products, with a regressive or
proportional incidence  outcome the standard result (see Jeetun 1978).
Stabilization  Payments
Results in Table 3 also reveal incidence effects for the Stablization Fund covering
coffee and cocoa.  In part, this is a reflection of the 1986 base-year  data used in the model,
since in the year large net receipts accrued to the Fund which acted as a tax on export
croppers.  In the early 1990s, the Fund is close to break-even  if not a net payer of revenues,
and hence in model  terms more like a subsidy. The gain to export croppers from removing
the 1986 tax is nearly 30 percent of income. Interestingly,  inactive households  share in this29
gain due to the large interhousehold transfers operating in CMte  d'Ivoire.  Government
employees  and households  in the formal sector lose due to the introduction  of the yield
neutral alternative tax which they must pay. 23
Subsidies
The elimination of subsidies, like other experiments  considered in Table 3,  has a
mixed incidence pattern with both positive and negative effects across households.  Food
croppers tend to lose because of the direct benefits they forgo from agricultural and other
subsidies; the inactive lose due to reduced inter-household  transfers; and other groups gain
due to reduced financing  requirements  (reflected  in a replacement  ly a yield-neutral  broadly
based subsidy).
A theme that strongly emerges from these results is that the Ivorian tax system has
large redistributive effects, but they criss-cross the rich-poor spectrum of household mean
incomes  in a number  of ways. Removing  import duties substantially  benefits  export croppers
while negatively  affecting  Government  employees  and formal sector households. These last
two groups gain from removing subsidies to  the poor due to lowered taxes, and from
removing progressive personal income taxes.  Low-income  food croppers lose from the
effective  broadening  of the VAT base, and the removal  of subsidies. And finally, given the
1986  data we use in which the Stabilization  Fund appears as a tax, export croppers benefit
23  Lambert, Schneider  and Suwa (1991)  also provide  evidence that  an increase  in the receipts
of the stabilization  fund is distributionally  regressive.30
from its removal, while higher income groups lose from the equal yield replacement tax
introduced  in its place.
Thus, positive and negative signs alternately appear in incidence profiles as one
moves from mean income poor to rich households. In part, this is because incidence  effects
by tax, in contrast to developed  countries, are more heavily  concentrated  on particular socio-
economic  groups, than they are by income range.  The importance  of the external sector,
given high protection is another factor.
Tax Incidence with No Inter-Household Transfers
A  further reason  for  the  criss-crossing explained previously,  is  the  role  that
interhousehold transfers play in determining tax incidence in Cote d'Ivoire.  As Table 1
suggests, they are large and as a result taxes thought to be borne by one household group
are indirectly borne by others through reduced transfer incomes.
Although  our data and model  do not capture the full pair wise flows  of interhousehold
transfers, the net flows (or receipts) we capture are still large enough to affect results.
Table 4 reports incidence  results for taxes in CMte  d'Ivoire where all interhousehold  transfers
are treated in the model  as, instead, being paid directly to the government,  so as to remove
the direct effects of interhousehold  transfers on incidence  results.
Compared  to Table 3, incidence  effects  change sign for some household  groups, such
as the inactive, and the general incidence  picture is substantially  different for each tax.  The
mechanism  underlying these differences  is that payers of transfers are little affected by the
model modification,  paying transfers in the central case model variant to other households31
and in the new model variant to the government.  But receivers of transfers, such as the
inactive  households  now receive  a larger overall proportional  share of government  revenues,
rather than directly receiving transfers from other households, substantially weakening
interhousehold  linkage in transfer activity and its influence  on tax incidence results.  These
differences  in results between Tables 3 and 4 thus suggest the importance  of interhouse'iold
transfers in assessing  the incidence  of taxes in economies  such as CMte  d'Ivoire.32
Table 4
Incidence Effects of Ivorian laxes  when all Interhousehold Transfers  are Eliminated
From The Data and Model
(Hicksian EVs expressed as percentage of benchmark gross income)
Introducing an equal yield non-distorting consumption tax to replace:
Stabili-
Personal  Production  Export  Import  zation
Households  Income Tax  Taxes  Tax  Duties  Fund  Subsidies
2  3  4  5  6
Poor  Food croppers
I  in Savannah  -1.17  -8.06  0.21  0.62  -0.88  -3.97
Export  croppers  -0.05  3.99  1.20  24.43  29.43  0.36
Small
businesses  -1.63  1.26  0.08  -0.17  -1.40  0.24
Other  food
croppers  -1.25  -9.00  0.21  0.58  -0.49  -4.39
Inactive  0.16  0.61  0.07  -0.43  -1.36  -0.06
Government
employees  4.62  2.10  -0.54  -8.13  -8.92  0.97
Rich  Households  in
formal sector  -0.22  2.89  -0.29  -10.38  -7.06  1.0633
Sensitivity  Analysis
We have  also investigated  the sensitivity  of tax incidence  results to model  features  and
parameters, conducting  a series of further incidence  analyses under a variety of alternative
model  specifications. One of the interesting  set of results is reported in Table 5, for the case
where we set all capital  labor substitution  elasticities  equal to 0.5 (see Table B2 in Appendix
B for the values used in the central case). 24 While these are admittedly relatively small
changes  in model specification,  results in Table 5 show little sensitivity  in incidence  findings
to these elasticity variations. Generally this is the case with other elasticity variations, but
for changes in model structure (such as variations in the relative size of fixed to variable
factors by industry), more variations can be obtained.
Thus  the  theme that emerges from these incidence analyses is  that mechanical
application  of partial equilibrium  incidence  analysis  based on shifting  assumptions  to African
economies  should only be undertaken  with extreme caution.  Country-specific  features such
as interhousehold  transfers can substantially  affect results; narrowness in tax bases implies
concentrated and localized incidence effects which may not be reflected in effects across
income ranges; and tax burdens may be transmitted to  other groups through changed
behavioral patterns.
24  Various changes in substitution elasticities between domestic and foreign products in
consumption  and production for the removal  of imports duties analyzed in Table 3, also show
little sensitivity in incidence  results.34
Table 5
Incidence  Analyses  of the Incidence  of Ivorian  Taxes
under Elasticity Sensitiv.Wtv  Analysis  for Table 5 Results
(Capital-Labor  Substitution  Elasticities  in all Industries
Set Equal to 0.5)
(Hicksian  EVs expressed as percentage of benchmark  gross income)
lntroduciin! an equal X-ld.  non-distortiny  consumption tax to replace:  1
Households  Stabili-
Personal  Production  Export  Import  zation
income tax  tax  tax  duties  Fund  Subsidies
1  ~2  3  4  5  6
Food croppers
in Savannah  -0.64  -6.41  0.27  0.77  0.56  -3.58
Export croppers  -0.25  4.68  1.18  24.20  28.01  0.87
Small
businesses  -1.57  1.32  0.12  -0.06  -1.45  0.23
Other  food
croppers  -1.50  -7.82  0.08  0.39  -2.76  -3.17
Inactive  2.65  -2.58  0.39  1.01  5.18  -2.82
Government
employees  3.40  2.37  -0.71  -8.98  -10.89  1.50
Households in
formal sector  -0.62  3.39  -0.40  -10.77  -8.71  1.7135
IV.  ASSESSING  THE EFFECTIVENESS  OF ANTI-POVERTY  PROGRAMS
This chapter deals with targeting benefits to poor households  using the same type of
analysis described in the previous chapter.  The purpose however is to  examine how
conventional targeting theory, primarily analyzed in a partial equilibrium framework is
modified  when applied in a general equilibrium  context. We first provide a brief review  of
existing transfer mechanisms  in Cote d'Ivoire, then  outline the household  sector in the model
in terms of the grouping,  and the poverty  incidence  obtained  from the functional  distributions
adopted.  The principles  of cargeting  and the derivation of the size of the various targeting
programs are also discussed.  These calculations  are then used for counterfactual  analysis
using the model  and the conventional  policy approach is re-examined  in light of the results
obtained.
Social Transfers in C6te d'Ivoire
Targeting programs, have been extensively used to  redistribute income in  Cote
d'Ivoire. 25  They have been a key part of social expenditure  programs which represent the
highest share of total government expenditure. In 1990 for example, total expenditure  on
education and health was over 50 percent of total recurrent expenditure, of which 35.6
percent went on education and 6.7 percent went on health.  Within the general education
budget, the government  committed  itself to subsidize  education  expenditures  and specifically
students' costs such as living expenses, books and other expenditures  through  direct transfer
25 Targeting programs can include both transfers and price subsidies.  The latter,  in an
extreme form, is equivalent  to direct cash transfers. See Besley  and Kanbur (1988)  and Jesurun-
Clements (1992).36
schemes; in  1990 transfers totalled 12.5 percent of the education budget (see Table 6).
Although  educational  cash transfers  are sector specific  and not directly  for poverty  alleviation
purposes, they are  for all practical purposes a  targeting scheme using education as an
indicator. 26
Table 6
Structure  of Transfers  by Education  Level
1983. 1990 (CFAF Million)
TRANSFER
1983  1990
SECTOR  CFAF Million  %  CFAF Million  %
Primary  4,142  12.6  3,410  13
Secondary  8,298  25.2  8,732  33.5
Higher  14,030  42.7  11,111  42.6
Technical  6,403  19.5  2,835  11.8
Total  32,875  100  26,088  100
% Total Education  Budget  17  12.5
Source:  World Bank (1987, Vol. II)
Available evidence suggests that the main beneficiaries have been urban students in
higher education with award criteria that were never applied, thus creating a  less than
26  Whether  education transfers have been used explicitly  by the Government  for alleviating
poverty is an important question that is not however addressed in this paper.  Besides the
distributional  implications  of the existing transfer  scheme, another question  is whether education
is an efficient indicator for targeting programs to the poor.  For a discussion of targeting by
indicators see Besley and Kanbur (1988), and Thorbecke  and Berrian (1988).37
equitable  system. The education  targeting  program also points to the political  considerations
that need to be taken when evaluating  any targeting  program. In the context of the education
program, the Government has been reluctant to  reduce them for fear of alienating the
politically sensitive student body. 27 Any transfer scheme to reduce poverty will therefore
be at the expense of  some other government expenditure and this trade-off needs to be
accounted  for.
Implementing Analysis of Targeting in tk  Model
Two characteristics  of the treatment of households  in the model are important for
targeting analysis.  The first relates to the disaggregation  of the household  sector and the
second relates to measures of poverty incidence and income distribution in the structure
adopted.
Apart from considerations  mentioned  earlier, the choice of household  disaggregation
is a function of the policy issues addressed whether undertaking tax incidence analysis or
assessing  targeting  programs. As will become  apparent, by classifying  households  according
to socio-economic  grouping, the type of targeting scheme to be adopted is in large part
predetermined. In general, the division  of the household  sector, using income levels has two
major drawback from a targeting perspective.  With such a disaggregation, a household's
relative position is affected by the policy change since income varies, and it is impossible
27 As Table 8 shows, the total transfer program represented  in 1990 12.5  percent of the total
education budget.  Under a human resources adjustment program the education transfers are
projected  to fall to 6 percent by 1995 of the operating budget while improving the targeting of
these transfers to help the neediest.38
to target  a specific  group. Socio-economic  criteria, on the other hand, implicitly  assume less
mobility  between  groups, over the short run at least (Pyatt and Round 1976, and World Bank
1990).  The  second drawback is  that such an approach presupposes that groups are
identifiable; i.e. for example, one can physically  identify the top decile.  How to identify
households by income level is  one of  the major constraints for targeting programs; a
disaggregation  that follows socio-economic  criteria incorporates  at least some identification
of the households. Thus, it is easy to identify  households  living in the Savannah, or those
that work in the traditional  export sector, or even those who are government employees. 8
Since our targeting analyses are concerned with eliminating poverty, we need to
describe the income distribution  adopted in the model  and how the poverty incidence  in turn
is derived. The functional  distribution used follows Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson  (1989).
A log-normal distribution is constructed for each household group, with the log-variance
obtained exogenously  (e.g., household survey), and the arithmetic mean income from the
benchmark data set. 29 For each policy simulation, the model provides a corresponding
mean income, ° and for a given poverty line Z, the z-score is obtained and the poverty
28  The adoption of socio-economic  criteria is equivalent to adopting a universal targeting
scheme with indicators. This is similar to what Besley and Kanbur (1988) and Thorbecke  and
Berrian (1988) suggest in order to reduce the leakages  of a universalistic  transfer scheme.
29 The log-mean is IA  =  In (9) - ½o2  where y is the arithmetic mean income, ,u is the log
mean, and a" is the log-variance.
30  The resulting mean income is expressed in 1986 prices.39
incidence calculated for each group.  Note that since the log-variance is  exogenously
determined, it remains fixed in the counterfactual  analysis. 3'
Table 7 gives the head count ratio for each group and the contribution to total
poverty.  In general the poverty profile obtained  from the model  is similar to Kanbur (1990)
with some relative differences.  The household  with the highest poverty incidence is the
Savannah  household  with 63.68 percent of the population  living below the poverty line, and
contributing  to  19 percent of national poverty.  The informal household  group also has a
relatively high poverty incidence  while contributing  the most to national  poverty. Interesting
differences  with Kanbur (1990)  is the high incidence  of poverty in the export households  44
percent, compared to 36.5 percent using the 1985 household  survey, and for the government
household, 3.1 percent in  1985, compared to 8.69 percent in the model. 32 In general the
model shows that the non-agricultural  poor contribute significantly  to national poverty (45
percent of total poverty).
31The poverty indexes obtained for each group is therefore determined in part by  the
exogenous log-variance  and by the adoption of a log-normal distribution. This has important
implications  for the size of the targeting program needed to eradicate poverty.
32 It is really not possible  to compare  both sets of figures since they are based on a different
data set, and different methods of calculation, but it does provide an idea of  the poverty
incidence adopted in  the model compared to other studies.  For example, the informal and
inactive households  are more represented in the 1986 survey than in the 1985 data set leading
to their higher contribution  to poverty [Kanbur (1990), Chia et al. (1991)].40
Table 7
Poverty Profile of Household Groups in the Model
Contribution  to
Household  Poverty Ratio  National Poverty
Export Croppers  44.04  24.03
Food Croppers in the Savannah  63.68  18.89
Other Food Croppers  34.46  11.84
Government  Employees  8.69  2.76
Formal Sector  1.79  0.36
Small Businesses  46.81  27.06
Inactive  37.07  15.06
All  37.16  100.00
Principles  of Targeting  33
Over the past decade there has been major debate on the social costs of implementing
adjustment programs in developing  countries.  It has been argued that adjustment policies
have led to a deterioration in general welfare and that poor households  were severely hit.
As a result, a series of actions were recommended  to mitigate  the effects of adjustment  on
the poor whether by protecting  them from temporary  shocks  or by increasing their effective
33 This section draws heavily on Besley  and Kanbur (1988).41
participation in the recovery programs.34 The use of targeting mechanisms to reach the
poor is a natural outcome of this debate and has been the focus of much attention.
Kanbur  (1987),  Ravallion and  Chao  (1987),  Besley and  Kanbur (1988), and
Thorbecke and Berrian (1988) provide an extensive discussion of the theoretical basis of
targeting. The objective in targeting is to make transfers to poor households  such that their
income level after the transfers is just  above the poverty line.  If  the income of  the
households  was perfectly measurable and poor households  could be identified, the transfer
program would target funds to  these poor households only.  This  extreme case called
"perfect  targeting" (since it assumes that each poor household  can be perfectly identified)  is
represented in Figure 3.  If a household  is below some poverty line Z, then an amount is
transferred to the household  such that its new income  just equals Z.  Any point below the
45- line implies that the household receives a (positive) transfer,  and any point above it
shows that the household  receives a negative  transfer, i.e.,  it is being taxed.  The total cost
of the poverty reduction program in such a case is simply the area of the triangle OZC."
The amount needed  to finance this program is simply  equal to the area OZC.  If this
transfer scheme is to be self-financed, the same amount must be obtained by taxing other
households. This is depicted  by the solid line below the 45  line where the households  that
are above Z are taxed.  As mentioned  earlier, the use of targeting mechanisms  is conditional
on the identification  of the poor.  In this extreme case, the size of the transfer program is
based on the assumption  that it is possible to identify  the poor below the poverty line Z.
I  See for example, Cornia et al. (1987), World Bank (1990b), UNDP (1990).
35 This assumes that the distribution  of income is uniform.42
The other extreme case ignores the issue of whether one is able to perfectly identify
the poor or not, and simply transfer to all househoids  an amount that would completely
eliminate poverty.  Under such a scheme, the total cost would be much larger than under a
scheme where transfers  are only given to the poor.  This "universalistic"  program is depicted
in Figure 2.  The figure shows  that to each and every household  an amount Z is transferred
such that there are no households  with an income below Z, which explains why there is a
parallel upward shift of the curve to a level Z.
The cost/benefit of both schemes is apparent; in the perfect targeting case total
transfers needed  to eliminate  poverty  are less, but there is a cost in identifying  the poor that
could easily outweigh the benefits from the smaller transfers.  Under a  universalistic
program, total transfers are higher but there is no a priori cost of identification. 36 From
an operational  perspective, the perfect targeting scheme is impossible to apply, and Besley
and Kanbur (1988)  suggest that universalistic  schemes are probably more realistic and have
indeed been applied. 37 But as Thorbecke and Berrian (1988) suggest, an  intermediate
solution is to use socio-economic  indicators that allow policy makers to reduce the size of
transfers under a universalistic  program.
36  For a more detailed analysis on the cost of identification  see Kanbur and Besley (1988).
See also World Development  Report (1990) for a general discussion on implementation  costs.
37  See Anand and Kanbur (1987).Now  Inime
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Figure 4.  Universal Targeting Scheme.
Source:  Besley and Kanbur (1988), World Bank.44
The household  sector as represented in the model is biased towards a universalistic
transfer scheme since there is no distinction  between the poor and non-poor in each of the
seven groups, so the targeting  programs are aimed at socio-economic  groups that are easily
identifiable.
The calculation of the transfer size can be derived from the Foster et al.  (1984)
poverty index:
[P.  (5)
or in terms of the income frequency  density function,f(y), such that
Pci =  f [.Z_Yjf  (y)dy  (6)
where n is total population,  q is the number of poor, Z is some pre-determined  poverty line,
yi is the income of the poor household  i and a  is a parameter that measures the depth of
poverty. 3"  In the case of perfect targeting, the amount needed to eliminate poverty is the
sum of the difference between the income of the poor and the poverty line Z or
Tp = E  (Z-y,)  (7)
38 The head-count  ratio is obtained when a  =  o; PO  = qln.45
This can easily be derived from Pa.  For o  =
P, =  £(--)  (8)
,iz
or,
Pin-  = Eq [:-yj  (9)
,.,
Thus, to calculate the amount of transfer needed to eliminate  poverty in a perfect targeting
scheme, one multiplies the poverty index PI by the poverty line and population  n.  For the
universalistic  scheme, each household  receives  an amount equal to the poverty line Z. 39
T,  = nZ  (10)
Note also that since the index is decomposable,  it is possible to apply it to the various m
household  groups, such that
P.  = £m x'  P.  (1 1)
where Ex, =  1.
Table 8 gives total transfers  needed  to eliminate  poverty under  a universalistic  scheme
using the benchmark incidence levels.  It is calculated using the log-normal distribution
39 Since Tu=nZ, P, can also be interpreted as the ratio of perfect  targeting to universalistic
targeting.46
adopted for each household group. 40 What Table 8 shows is that under a  universalistic
scheme, the transfer program to eradicate total poverty will be beyond the means of the
government. 4'  In the case of a perfect targeting program, the cost of a poverty-reducing
program would represent 3 percent of GDP.
40  The size of the transfers are obtained  by shifting  the function  such that the z-score  equals
-2.5; i.e. the head count ratio equals zero for each group.  Note that the size of the transfer
program is not equal to  T. because of  the log-normality assumption whereas Equation 41
assumes that it is uniformly distributed.
4' Using T. to calculate the cost of a universalistic  targeting program will give slightly less
than 50 percent of GDP.  As a comparison, Boetang  et al. (1991) calculate  the cost of a perfect
targeting scheme as well as a universalistic  program for Ghana. For the country as a whole, the
perfect targeting program amounts to 7  percent of GDP, while the universalistic program
amounts to 60 percent of GDP. World Bank (1990c)  shows that for Malawi, a perfect targeting
program will cost 4 percent of GDP.47
Table 8
Total Transfers in the Case pf Unlversal  (Imperfect)  Targeting
CFAF Million
Transfer
Household  Group  CFAF (Mill.)  % of Base Income
Export Croppers  760,000  196.1
Food Croppers  in the Savannah  421,000  262.9
Other Food Croppers  475,000  167.3
Government  Employees  384,000  69.9
Formal Sector  27,300  5.2
Small Businesses  1,380,000  311.3
Inactive  900,000  215.6
TOTAL  4,350,000
General Equilibrium  Analysis of Targeting Programs
Three issues are addressed; what are the general equilibrium  effects of implementing
a targeting program for poverty reduction?  This deals with whether the size of transfers
calculated in a partial equilibrium context are able to achieve zero head-count  ratios when
general effects  are included, and helps in turn quantify the leakages  of universalistic  targeting
programs.  Related to this issue is a distinction between the schemes when applied to all
households  simultaneously  or to one group only, which can significantly  affect the results
of the targeting program.  The second issue addressed, concerns the size of the transfer
program, and whether it makes a difference in poverty reduction targeting programs.  Put
another way, is the percentage gain in income due to targeting proportional to the transfer?
Finally, the political implications  of these targeting programs are analyzed.48
Quantifying the Leakage Effects of a Universalistic Transfer Program
As Figure 4 shows, targeting  programs based  on a universalistic  scheme would shift
the  function up by  an amount equal to  the poverty line Z.  Table 8 is  used for our
counterfactual  analysis.  Two types of count,..:  `actuals  are performed.  In the "ALL" case,
the transfers are  distributed to  all  households simultaneously.  In  the  second type of
counterfactual,  each household  in turn is targeted and receives a transfer shown in Table 8.
I.. both cases, this transfer as in the tax incidence  analysis uses a  differential incidence
concept where total real government revenues (and hence expenditures)  are kept constant.
In all the counterfactuals,  all households,  including  those that receive  the transfers are taxed.
Household  h therefore receives an amount rh(l-t,) where rh and /'  are respectively
the transfers received by and the average tax rate for group h.42 The percentage change
in utility (a measure of real income)  and the poverty index resulting from the policy change
are presented in Tables 9 and  10.  Table 9 shows that in  all the cases, the percentage
increase in final real income is less than the percentage increase in base income due to the
transfer.  This is better reflected in Table 10 that translates the relative changes in real
income in poverty measurements.  The objective of eliminating poverty is evidently not
reached.
42  By financing the transfer program with a tax imposed on all households  including the
beneficiaries of  the transfers, one captures the same problem of identifying households in
targeting  programs viz., identifying  households  as taxpayers  (or beneficiaries  of tax exemptions).
The financing scheme applied here therefore includes the leakages that arise from imposing a
tax to finance a transfer program, and assumes that the government is unable to distinguish --
from a tax policy perspective -- those exempted  from the scheme because they benefit from the
program and those that should be taxed.49
Table 9
Percentage Change in Utility Level from Benchmark
under a Universal Targeting Scheme
All  MEXP  MAGS  MVIVA  MADP  MFOR  MIND  MINAC
Export Croppers  33.24  78.51  -12.40  -16.89  7.82  40.30  -9.39  1.12l
Food Croppers in the Savannah  114.86  2.95  233.03  10.18  -6.44  -0.07  -38.61  -24.18
Other Food Croppers  100.27  -11.74  32.87  37.83  -13.30  -1.74  23.35  13.18
Government Employees  .70.82  .24.56  .18.36  -16.01  47.19  -1.92  -33.12  -11.64
Formal Sector  -79.35  -24.37  -13.38  -17.20  -13.79  3.39  -25.13  -6.53
Small Businesses  19.51  -15.93  -18.05  -6.85  -11.85  . -1.03  158.91  -17.93
Inactive  58.18  22.42  .46.22  44.09  3.60  1.86  -88.16  59.73
Table  10
Poverty  Index  (P.) under  a Universalistic  Transfer  Scheme
Base
Case  ALL  MEXP  N.!AV  MVIVA  MADP  MFOR  MIND  MINAC
Export Croppers  0.44  0.227  0.104  0.536  0.579  0.5  0.443  0.512  0.433
Food Croppers in the Savannah  0.637  0.425  0.614  0.019  0.56  0.f84  0.637  0.908  0.749
Other Food Croppers  0.345  0.046  0.433  0.176  0.159  0.444  0.356  0.215  0.264
Government Employees  0.087  0.699  0.176  0.147  0.138  0.026  0.092  0.23  0.121
Formal Sector  0.018  0.67  0.046  0.031  0.036  0.031  0.015  0.051  0.023
SmaUl  Businesses  0.468  0.367  0.564  0.579  0.504  0.536  0.476  0.071  0.579
Inactive  0.371  0.159  0.264  0.719  0.195  0.352  0.363  0.997  0.154
TOTAL  0.37  0.301  0.323  0.386  0.3S6  0.407  0.374  0.428  0.368
Table 9  shows that in the  "ALL" scenario when transfers are distributed to all
households  simultaneously, both government and the formal private sector householtds  loseso
in absolute terms from the universal targeting scheme.  Table 10 shows that under this
scenario, the head-count ratio increases from 8.7 percent to a dramatic 69.9 percent for
government households, and  increases from  1.8 percent to  67 percent for the formal
households. 43 For all the other households  the poverty index falls.  At the national level,
the universal transfer program when applied to all households reduces total poverty by 7
percentage  points from 37 percent to 30.1 percent. In the traditional  calculations,  this would
have led to a total eradication  of poverty.
The results obtained under the "ALL" scenario are driven by the financing scheme
imposed.  Since the program is self-financed  with a neutral effect on the real government
budget, the high-income  households will pay more than what they receive.  At the same
time, the results are affected by the inter-household  transfers since poor household  groups
that receive transfers from the high income households  would bear part of the tax burden so
that the poverty reduction is less than anticipated."  The individual scenarios produce a
different pattern.  Looking at the figures in Table 10, we see that even when the transfer
scheme is applied to each group individually,  total poverty for the group is not eliminated.
For example, when the MEXP is targeted, poverty for this group is reduced by 76 percent,
but there is still a core poverty level of 10 percent of total population  in the export sector.
The same is true for the other households.  The head-count ratio resulting from these
43 World Bank  (1990)  provides similar results for Malawi. An income transfer program has
a significant impact on the poor at the expense of the non-poor.  The resultq do not take into
account  general equilibrium  effects.
I  Our simulation results also indicated that the leakage effect will be smaller when the
feature of inter-household  transfer is taken out from the model.51
counterfactuals  can be interpreted as a measure of the leakage effect due to relative price
changes, as well as the financing  of the universal targeting program. 45
The head count ratio also suggests some core poverty within each socio-economic
group that cannot be reached  and eliminated  even with a universal  targeting  program. From
a policy perspective, the results point to the importance  of using targeting programs with
indicators that can reach the lowest income households  within each group since no transfer
level can completely eliminate poverty.  Table 10 is derived from the earlier tables and
shows the individual  poverty levels (or hard core poverty) and the indexes as a percentage
of  base case poverty.  For  some household groups such as  the  Savannah food crop
households,  the targeting scheme  eliminates  poverty except  for 1.9 percent of the population,
or  3 percent of the total poor in the Savannah food croppers.  The results show that a
universalistic  targeting  scheme  implemented  in the Savannah  region would be quite effective,
with minimal leakages.  This is less so for the other food crop households  living in other
regions of C6te d'Ivoire where the post-transfer poverty level is less than half of the base
case level.  Non-agricultural  households  are similarly affected; government households  for
example are left with 8.7 percent of the households  below the poverty line which represents
less than a third of the total poor of this group in the pre-transfer case.
45 Thorbecke and Berrian (1988) develop a generic SAM-based  fix-price model to analyze
the effects of imposing a targeting program.  Because the model assumes fixed prices, there
cannot be any relative price effects, and "any exogenous  increases  in income are converted into
greater production rather than higher prices."  The model will, therefore, augment the final
benefit the households  receive.  Evidently  the results show that this could be quite misleading.
They also assume that the targeting  program is exogenously  determined,  e.g. foreign  aid, which
can also substantially  affect the results as we have shown.52
Table 11
Identifying  Hard Core Poverty after a Universal  Targeting  Program
Household Group  Base Case  With Transfer  % of Base Case
Export Croppers  0.44  0.104  23.67
Food Croppers in the Savannah  0.637  0.019  02.98
Other Food Croppers  0.345  0.159  46.09
Government  Employees  0.087  0.026  29.89
Formal Sector  0.018  0.015  83.33
Small Businesses  0.468  0.071  15.17
Inactive  0.371  0.154  41.51
What the results show is that universal  targeting  programs fare better for agricultural
households  than for non-agricultural  households, although within each group there can be
wide variations.  In general, the analysis points to the importance  of developing  targeting
mechanisms  geared towards the hard core of some  groups of the population  while for other
groups, a transfer program such as a universal targeting scheme  is sufficient  to produce the
expected results.  In the case where a universal  targeting scheme has relatively little effect,
the  investment needed to  develop targeting programs closer  to  perfect  schemes  is
unavoidable.
The targeting  program for individual  households  also affects the final income of other
households  through inter-household  transfers.  In column three of Table 9,  targeting the
export households  only, will yield real increases in income for the Savannah  households  as
well as the inactive households. The number  of poor in the Savannah  food crop households53
falls from 63.7 percent to 61.4 percent, while the poverty index for the inactive households
falls by  10.7 percentage points.  The reason for these positive effects are due to inter-
household transfers that benefit inactive and Savannah households given that the export
households  are net payers of transfers.  A targeting  program to reduce  poverty in the export
sector will have positive externalities  on households  that receive transfers from the export
households, even though they may be taxed to finance the targeting scheme.  When the
program is targeted to government households, inactive households  see their real income
increase by 1.86 percent, causing a fall in the poverty index from 37 percent to 35 percent.
The same simulation  with no interhousehold  transfers  cause a 1.2 percent fall in real income
for inactive households.
A different picture is also obtained, column four of Table 10 shows the effects on
poverty of a transfer program to the Savannah  households. This time, export and inactive
households  lose from such a scheme.  Real income for the latter households  falls by 46.2
percent and by 12.4 percent for the former.  This pattern is repeated at various degrees for
all the other scenarios.  The lesson to be drawn is that universal targeting programs have
important  feedback  effects that are not taken in traditional  targeting analysis. No households
gain as much as the original increase  in income due to the transfer because of the financing
required through new taxes.  When inter-household  transfers are included some households
gain less from a targeted program directed at another group.  The operational relevance  of54
these results are significant;  if one of the groups cannot easily be identified, it is possible to
reduce to some degree its poverty level by targeting another group.46
At  the  national poverty  level,  a  targeting program  to  all  households which
redistributes income from the high income households  to low income households,  will have
the greatest effect, total poverty falling from 37 percent to 30.1 percent (Table 10).  The
transfer scheme only to the foodcrop households  in the Savannah is not beneficial at the
national poverty level and total poverty increases  by 1.6 percentage point.  A transfer to the
government households, will also increase national poverty, whereas targeting programs
directed to  inactive households, export and  foodcrop households will reduce  national
poverty. 47 In all these results, the size of the transfers to the various groups is an important
issue examined in the following  section.
Varying  the Size of the Targeting  Program
In the previous section, it was shown that the leakage effects were such that under
a universal  targeting program, it was not possible to fully eliminate  poverty.  If the level at
which poverty could be eliminated under a  universalistic scheme has been shown to be
insufficient,  will higher transfer levels eliminate  poverty? But since the size of transfers is
I  For example, the inactive households  are difficult to identify since they encompass a
relatively wide group of people.  In such a case, it may be possible to target some other groups
on the evidence that there are strong externalities  that could benefit the inactive households.
This also points to the fact that the overall effect of a targeting program is incorrectly measured,
if the feedback  effects are not taken into account (over or under-estimated).
47 For a detailed discussion  on the optimal  distribution  of a transfer program that minimizes
poverty, see Thorbecke and Berrian (1988).55
already high, are the leakage effects similar when transfers are scaled down?  Figure 5
shows the percentage change in  real income over a range of transfer levels; up to  100
percent of each household  benchmark  gross income. These graphs are identical to Figures
3 and 4.  The 45'  line shows that a one percent increase in income leads to a  similar
increase in  (real) income.  Any point below the line will show decreasing returns and
similarly any point above the 45  line will show an increase in income greater than the
percentage increase in transfers.
Figure 5, for example, shows  that for most households,  small transfers have a greater
relative effect than larger transfers.  As transfers are gradually increased as a percentage of
base income, the leakages are greater.  These results are obtained for all households,  but at
various degrees as indicated  by the graphs.  In general, leakage effects are smallest for the
Savannah  households  (MAGS)  and partial equilibrium  analysis  does provide  a good indicator
of the required targeting  program. This is because  as the poorest households,  the Savannah
households  have the smallest  income and hence the smallest  tax burden. This contrasts with
the other agricultural households where targeting programs have the  highest leakages,
increasing with the size of the transfer.  Ravallion  and Chao (1987) obtain similar results,
where the percentage gains from targeting are greater the smaller the budget, and Glewwe
(1990) also finds similar results from econometric work.  The graph clearly indicates that
for given poverty objectives, the cost is higher than expected for most of the household
groups. As an example, eliminating  poverty from government  households  requires a transfer
program equivalent to 33 percent of base income.  By including leakages, the results show56
that the initial program required to obtain a zero poverty level would have to equal 40
percent of base income; a 21 percent increase in transfers.Figure  5
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Figure 6 plots the targeting program for the "ALL" case for 17 different levels of
transfers.  The results reveal that government  and formal sector households  have negative
net gains for all levels of transfers. 48 so ^nnclude,  the size of the transfer greatly matters.
Some households  benefit, in relative terms, from smaller transfers.  Given that this usually
occurs at realistic targeting levels, i.e. a small percentage of base income, it is possible to
achieve the targets at a lower cost.  Put another way, for a given budget one can achieve
higher targets than expected.
The Political  Economy of Targeting Programs
The political feasibility of the targeting programs has largely been ignored in our
analysis.  However, from a policy perspective,  it is of crucial importance  especially if the
programs face budgetary  constraints. In such cases, there is a clear redistribution  of income
for a fixed level of total income and the high income level groups may not be willing to
accept such a program.  Besley  and Kanbur (1988)  suggest that a perfect targeting program
may not have enough political weight  to be implemented  since it will solely benefit the poor
probably at the expense of the middle and upper-income  groups.  The replacement of a
universalistic scheme by a more targeted program they argue, would delink the implicit
alliance that may exist between the poor and the middle class groups because the latter
automatically  benefit from a universalistic  program. 49 The results shown in the paper point
to a different albeit not contradictory argument. Figure 6 shows that a universal targeting
48 Note also that for the informal sector households, the curve is concave.
49  See also Murthy et al. (1990) who make the same argument.Figure  6
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program taxed the high income groups (formal and government),  irrespective  of the level of
transfers, so that such a program is undoubtedly  politically infeasible.  However, this is
despite  the fact  that within  each  of the other  groups,  both  low  and middle-income  households
are positively affected. The export households  group for example  is made up of low as well
as high-income  households  that benefit  from the universalistic  target program imposed. The
analysis points once more to the importance of dividing the household sector in distinct
socio-economic  groups that can capture the political feasibility of the various programs.
Thus, even though the lower and middle class households  in the other groups benefit from
the universal  targeting scheme, which of the middle  class groups affected  can determine the
political  outcome?61
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper reports on a  general equilibrium-based  social policy model for Cote
d'Ivoire  detailing its structure, the data used in its implementation,  and providing two
examples  of its application: one to analyze tax incidence, the other to anti-poverty  programs.
The details of the model are set out in the text above (15 sectors, 7 household  groups, CES
functional  forms), along with the policy configurations  it contains.
The model results reporting  tax incidence  analysis emphasize  how special features of
the Ivorian economy and tax  system are  central to  any assessment of the distribution
consequences of  tax and other social policies in C6te d'Ivoire.  Because the bases of
individual taxes tend to be narrow with a strong sectoral or socioeconomic  group focus,
incidence effects by socioeconomic  group are pronounced, while effects by income range
seem to  be  milder.  Urban employees are  largely affected by  income taxes  (through
withholding); export food croppers are the groups affected by the stabilization  fund and
export taxes.  In addition, large interhousehold  transfers in C6te d'Ivoire change incidence
profiles from conventional  analysis. This is because taxes seemingly  borne by one household
group have second-round  effects on other household  groups through  changed interhousehold
transfers.
Concerning  the targeting  programs, the analysis shows  that when general equilibrium
effects  are taken into account, and given a budget  neutral targeting program, it is impossible
to completely  eliminate poverty as it would be suggested under traditional  analysis.  At the
same time, small transfers generally have a greater relative effect than larger targeting
programs.  This has several policy implications  in terms of the actual cost of the programs62
and the choice of groups that should benefit from these programs.  As in the tax incidence
analysis, the paper shows that domestic features such as interhousehold  transfers play an
important role in determining the final outcome of the targeting program.  Finally, the
political feasibility  of the programs are analyzed, in light of the results obtained from the
counterfactual  analysis.
The paper should not be seen as directly tied to only enhancing  the model structure
itself, but rather reflective of an effort to provide input into policy debate and the wider
policy process in CMte  d'Ivoire.  Two aspects  of the model  need to be mentioned: first, the
model should  be seen as an instrument  that helps in developing  capacities  for macro-analysis
and enhance in general the economic debate.  It should be transparent enough to enable
policy makers to use it in an efficient way.  But the model structure presented in the paper
must also be able to answer some  key questions  that are of relevance  to the Ivorian  economy.
The second aspect  is the evident  need to move  from the traditional  general equilibrium  model
focused  on social policy questions  as at present, to one where there is more discussion  of the
treatment  of time, and the incorporation  of an explicit intertemporal  structure, as well as a
modeling  of exchange  rates and money  and with them the associated  issues of the role CMte
d'Ivoire in the Franc Zone.  Refinement  of existing parameter estimates  that have been used
in the model, particularly elasticities,  is also critical in providing a better representation  of
the economy.
Overall, our contention  is that what has been developed  thus far provides a useful and
usable social policy framework for CMte  d'Ivoire which can generate rich inputs into the
Ivorian policy process.VII.  BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Two  levels of  nesting are  used.  At  the top  level, producers in  sector j  use
intermediate inputs (AU,...Aj 5j) and value-added  (VA) to produce output (Qj).  A Leontief
production function is used which combines intermediate inputs and value added in fixed
proportions, implying that there is no substitution  between intermediate inputs and value
added.
Q; = min (A 0 j, ...,A,5j,  VAj)  j  =  ,...,  15  (Al)
A Leontief input-output  technology is also assumed for intermediate  demands.  A4
denotes the amount of intermediate  input i used in sectorj  and a, is the intermediate  input-
output coefficient. The demands for intermediate  inputs by sector  j are:
A.j = a,, Qj  i =  I,..,  1S  (A2)
This Leontief specification  for intermediate inputs implies that demands for intermediate
inputs depend o:ily on technology (the a.) and are independent  of prices.
Each  intermediate requirement A.  can  be  met by  using a  substitutable mix of
comparable imported (AMu)  and domestically  produced goods (ADd)  represented by a CES
function.  If or,u  is the elasticity of substitution  between  AD, and AM.,
I Appendix C details the notation used in the equations in this and the other subsections
which follow, which together provide a formal presentation  of the model.70
A  =  (P,,jSjADO  +  A  '  i=1,...,15  j=l,...,15  (A3)
Industry  Value-Added Functions
Value-added  in sector  j  (VA,), is a CES function  of labor (L,) and variable  capital
inputs (K,). Labor and capital are treated as perfectly mobile across sectors, and capital is
assumed to be internationally  mobile. 2 If (pj is the CES function efficiency parameter; 5b.
is the distribution parameter in the CES function for factors, and aj  is the elasticity of
substitution  between the factors, the CES function is given by:
VA}  =  ,  |  '+  (1  - 5)i  )0rJ9  j=l,..,  15 (A4)
Demands for Variable Factors
Factor demands  are derived from cost-minimizing  behavior, given the CES functions
above.  7  and  1, represent the gross-of-tax  prices of the inputs  L and K respectively
2 For the agricultural  sector, in addition  to variable capital, we also specify specific  factors.
This is necessary to avoid the problem of  specialization, typical in a  small open-economy
assumption.71
in sector  j,  given the net-of-tax  prices, XrL  and 7rK.  If  ti  and  tK  are the tax rates levied
on labor and capital in sector  j,  then
rL, =  XL( 1 +tL)  j=l,...,15  (A5)
rK =rk(l+  +tK)  j=1,...,15  (A6)
Producers in sector  j  obtain their per-unit value-added  facLor  demands by minimizing  their
after-tax factor cost subject to VA,  equalling unity.  The Lagrangean  for this problem is:
lrZ  =  ,,  L  rkK,  Kj  + (1  -V)  1,Kj(-)  15  (A7)
The first order conditions yield derived demands for L and K in sector  j per unit of value-
added, represented by  f  and  fk  respectively:
= 1.  (1 -8b) |  )  @  ib  j==l  1...  15  (A8a)
ipq  GI  J)iz72
fb  f  ;l  5  *  |  +(lI  -65)  j=l,...,15  (A8b)
5,v  irK,
Treatment  of the Labor Market
The model structure includes a treatment of labor market which is more complete
than in other general equilibrium models. There is explicit modeling of labor (see Fig. 1).
In the agricultural  sector, L is a CES function of agricultural  labor (TAC)  and a composite  of
skilled (TA) and unskilled  labor (TNOA).  In the non-agricultural  formal sectors, L is a CES
function of skilled (TOA)  and unskilled  labor (TNj).  As for the informal sector, it only uses
T,a,.  This more detailed treatment of the labor markets help to identify the effects of
alternative  policies  on different labor components  and capture migration  processes when the
feature of urban-rural migration  is incorporated  into the model.
Demand
The demand side of the model reflects government  expenditures  and demands of the
seven household groups.  Each of the households  has endowments  and preferences, with
fLxed  exogenous  endowments  of labor, capital and sector-specific  factors.
The gross income of household  h,  I1, is
3
yh  =  Er,  +  ahr-TP  +TRh  h=1,...,7  (A9)
lrk(O73
r represents total government transfers to households,  and C,h denotes the proportion of r
transferred to household  h, and hence  ahr gives the transfers received by household  h.  TP'
and TR'  define interhousehold transfers paid and received by h.  woht  is household h's
endowment of factor k and irk is the net-of-tax price received by household h as factor
owners.  If rh is the marginal income tax rate on factor income for household h, then the
disposable income for household  h is given by:
r, =  (1--r  ]'k%k  +  Cihr  - TP +  M  h= 1.,7  (Al0)
K81
Household preferences are  defined over  the  15  composite goods  (G)  defined  over
comparable domestic and imported products.  Figure 2, in the text, provides a schematic
representation  of the nesting  structure used in the household  utility functions. There are two
levels of nesting in the utility function.  Ue is a Cobb-Douglas  function defined over the
composite goods (G0f). Different Cobb-Douglas parameters are  specified to  reflect the
different preferences across households.  Let  I be the share of good i in household  h's
consumption  of G,; and pi(l +ri) be the gross-of-tax  price of G 1 where ri is the consumption
tax on Gi.
The utility maximization  problem for household  h is to
ma{ Uh  SY  logGh  h=l...,7(
h)~"  (All1)74
subject to:
r p 5(l+*)Gdh  - Yd  -pSh  hol,...,7  (A12)
i-1
Where PJ  represents the saving of household  h.
At the lower level in the nesting structure,  j.,  is the CES weighing parameter on
GD',  and GM, and  0.js the elasticity  of substitution  between GD',  and GM,;  for household
h.  At this level, the budget constraint for household  I is:
E [ P 4GDh  +PGMh  ] y  (A13)
where  yjs the disposable  income of household  h to be allocated  to composite  good i, which
is obtained from the top level utility maximization  exercise.
At the lower level, each household  solves a maximization  problem:
Max  GM  U2  is  U2(GD,GM)
(GD,h,  r h  GD'"  (1 _.hdGMh  w]'~  (A14)
h +P|,.GMi  =  (A ) pd,GDi^+^M  Yi'  (A15)75
Solving this yields
GDh  eiP
<<,<  (  - (A  16)
Pd LeWPd  +  I  fOmi) ' m
GM'h  (l-  )
pi3mi)Up-e  zF  (  -152s,)ip  j(A17)
P.h  PlUd  + (1  P  q~
Since we  use  continuous utility  functions, market demand functions are  also
continuous in addition  to satisfying  Walras' law.  Aggregating  across households' demands
yields market demands.
Savings  and Investment
As noted in the text, this is a static model so household savings are not a decision
variable, with household  h's  saving (S h) determined  as a fixed portion of income.  Under
the model  treatment, savings finance  investment  with SI transferred to an investment  mutual
fund agent  who then  invests in  newly produced capital goods.  These  expenditures
correspond to the investment  by all the branches identified  in the social accounting matrix.
Since these expenditures are financed by household's savings, investments  are  "savings-
driven" in the model. 3
3 For a discussion of the implications  of various savings and investment closure rules, see
Dervis et al. (1989), and Adelman  and Robinson  (1988).76
Equilibrium  Conditions  in the Model
The model solves for equilibrium  product and factor prices, activity levels and tax
revenues  that satisfy  all the equilibrium  conditions  in the model. These cover demand supply
equalities  for goods  and factors, and zero profit conditions  for each sector. These conditions
can be represented  algebraically  as follows:
i.  Market clearing for all goods and factors:
Ef,9  S  Nk  k1  ...... ,3(A  18)
j-1
7  15
EGih +  Ea,Q, ￿  QJ  j=l,...,15  (A19)
h-I  i-l
ii.  Zero profits conditions in all sectors
(1-tp)wrjQj  = r(1+tk);  +  r.4a 41Qj  j=l,  .. ,15  (A20)
i=177
The key properties of equilibrium  which  follow from these  conditions  include budget  balance
for the household  and government  sectors:
i.  Household budget balance:
is  3
Ep,(+.r,)Gg  + TPh = EvA*  +  ahr  +  TRh  - V  (A21)
ii.  Government  budget balance:
Is
EpP( +Tr)Gi8  +  S'+  p 11r  =  R  (A22)78
APPENDIX B
IMPLEMENTING THE MODELLING APPROACH
We use  the counterfactual  equilibrium  analysis procedure described in Mansur and
Whalley  (1984) to implement  the modelling  approach  set out above. This approach involves
three steps:  the construction  of base data (a SAM), the calibration  of model  parameters to
the base data, and computation  of counterfactual  equilibria for the policy or other changes
to be analyzed.
Base-Period  Data for the Model 4
The  base-period  data used for the model  are contained  in a Social Accounting  Matrix
(SAM) constructed for the C6te d'Ivoire  for 1986.5  The sources for and methods of
construction  of the SAM are documented  in Chia, Enoh and Wahba (1991). The basic input
data for the SAM were obtained from the National Accounts  (Rdpublique  de Cote d'Ivoire,
1990) and other sources such as the Balance of Payments from the Banque de donndes
financieres, household  survey data, and tax data.
A  SAM provides a  consistent accounting of  the  circular flow of  incomes and
expenditures in  an economy for a  particular year.  Transactions in  the  economy are
represented in  matrix form.  By convention, entries in  any row of the  SAM represent
revenue sources, and entries in any column represent  payments.  Thus, each cell in a table
4  Also see Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1989), and Pyatt (1987) for a description  of the
use of SAMs in model construction.
I  The year 1986 was chosen because this is the latest year with a consistent set of national
accounts data as well as a household  budget survey for C6te d'Ivoire.79
reports a payment from a column account to a row account.  Each account balances, with
incomes exactly equalling expenditures such that the column sums in  a SAM equal the
'rresponding row sums.
There are six main accounts in a SAM:  those for factors, institutions, investment,
activities, commodities and the rest of the world.  Each account can  then be  further
disaggrcgated  to reflect the socio-economic  structure of the economy being considered and
particular policy modelling  needs.  For example, factors of production can be identified  as
different forms of sector-specific  capital and different  categories  of labor (agricultural  labor,
qualified labor, non-qualified  labor, and public administration  labor).  Households  can be
classified according to socio-economic  status with a distinction made between domestically
produced  and imported  commoditic-  In the SAM used here, the government  sector includes
such institutions  as the Caisse de Staoilisation  and the Caisse de Perequation.
The SAM as constructed  also satisfies the various equilibrium  conditions implied  by
the model structure we use.  Aggregate supply of each good equals aggregate demand.
Aggregate supply includes both domestic production and imports, while aggregate demand
includes both intermediate  and final demands. Final demands include private consumption
expenditures, government expenditures, capital  formation and  exports.  In  addition,
industries earn  normal  economic profits;  i.e.,  total  receipts  from  sales equal  total
expenditures;  total sales include payments for intermediate  demands, final demands and net
trades; total costs of production include costs of intermediate input, payments to primary
fac.ors, net payments  to the Caisse de Stabilisation,  Caisse  de Perequation,  and taxes. Taxes80
paid by the production sectors include the production value-added  tax,  import duties and
export taxes.
The  base-period equilibrium data  set  must be  micro-consistent and  satisfy all
equilibrium  conditions  and properties  of the model given in equations (23) to (27):  market
clearance for all goods and factors; all 15 sectors earn zero profit; budget balance  holds for
all 7 household  groups; and government  budget balance.  The SAM once constructed thus
provides  a  base-period equilibrium data  set,  which  can  be  used  in  the  numerical
implementation  of the general equilibrium model described above, since calibration of the
model to the data in the SAM involves base data consistent  with the equilibrium structure
of the model.
Calibration of Parameters
Calibration  of the COte  d'Ivoire model to the 1986 SAM requires the determination
of parameter values for the various behavioral functions in the model such that the model
reproduces the benchmark data as  equilibrium solution. 6 Calibration of Cobb-Douglas
functions is relatively straightforward. Scale parameters in the Cobb-Douglas  function can
be determined simply from the input shares of factors.  However, the procedures used to
determine the share and other parameters in the CES functions  through calibration  are more
complex.
6  See also the discussion  of calibration  in Michel  and Noel (1984), and especially  the modele
de prevision  macro-4conomique  used by the planning  department  in C6te d'Ivoire.81
The first step, and following Harberger (1962), is to use a unit's  convention to
separate the benchmark equilibrium data for the SAM into separate price and quantity
observations.  For example, by assuming the net-of-tax price of labor to be one in the
benchmark  equilibrium  the quantity  of labor demanded  by sector i is determined  directly by
the value-added  data on labor use in sector i.  With this separation  of value observations  in
the SAM into price and quantity observations  complete, model calibration is implemented
for the CES functions  in the ways described in Mansur and Whalley (1984) using elasticity
parameters from a literature search. 7 The specification  used for the central case variant of
the model in implementing the calibration procedures is outlined in Table BL.  The key
elasticity parameters used in  the  model on  the  production side  for capital-labor and
qualified-nonqualified  labor substitution  a.e set out in Table B2.
The specifics of how calibration procedures are applied can be illustrated for the
parameters of the CES value-added  functions  in each sector. Consider the CES value-added
function in equation (A4) reproduced  here:
VAj =plilkLj  +  (1  5)K(GY1)IoIrv'w  (Bl)
Producers minimize the  cost  of  providing a  unit of  value-added by  minimizing the
Lagrangean; given in equation (A7)
'Scale parameters in the Cobb-Douglas  function are determined from the input shares of
factors.82
£  rL+  K  4  {^Si+  (-1)I  (l  8)K(O-1)I)lY  - 1]  (B2)
Table BI
Summary of the Specification  of the Central Case Variant
of the Model Used in Calibration
A.  PRODUCTION
- fifteen sectors
- nested CES function
- Leontief function of value-added  and intermediate  demand
- Value-added  is CES function  of capital and labor
- Intermediate  demand is a CES function of domestically  produced goods and
imported goods
- two categories of capital
- non-agricultural  capital - fully mobile
- Sector-specific  agricultural capital
- three labor types
- skilled labor
- unskilled labor in agricultural sector
- unskilled  labor in non-agricultural  sector
B.  CONSUMPTION
- seven household types
- CES utility function defined over Armington  goods
C.  KEY FEATURES
- interhousehold  transfers
- small open price-taking  economy
- goods distinguished  between domestically  produced83
Table B2
Production-Side Elasticities of Substitution Used in the Cote d'Ivoire Model
Elasticity of substitution
Elasticity  of substitution  between qualified and non-
Sectors'  between capital and labor  qualified labor
1.  Food crop  0.4  0.6
2.  Traditional export  0.4  0.6
3.  Non-traditional  export  0.5  0.6
4.  First transformation  (F)  0.8  0.4
5.  First transformation  (I)  0.9  0.8
6.  Manufacturing  (F)  0.8  0.4
7.  Manufacturing (I)  0.9  0.8
8.  Gas, electricity  0.8  0.4
9.  Construction (F)  0.3  0.4
10.  Construction  (1)  0.4  0.8
11.  Transport  0.5  0.4
12.  Financial services  0.8  0.4
13.  Services (F)  0.8  0.4
14.  Services (I)  0.9  0.8
15.  Government  services  0.0  0.0
'F and I denote formal and informal sectors.84
The first order conditions with respect to L, and Kj are given by:
d  r  +  =Vj{  * }"  "(1  -65)K,"f  = 0  (B3)
and
ddaL.=7r; + Xp  }1-(u,-1)SV  L,  i  =  0,  (B4)
where {-} is  (f  L(7  1).u,  + (1-65)Kj  w  )  -
Dividing (B3) by (B4):
T!  (1  ,V)K"'
(B5)
Rearranging (B5), we can solve for 6,.
IrLLJ V/Ij
1  +  (7r,L  Lj  '  K  1/)  (B6)
Using the unit conventions  above, all the benchmark net-of-tax factor prices  rL and IrK are
set to one.  Equation (B6) can then be rewritten85
(  (1+tL)Lj  /(1 +t)Kj
1 +  [(1 +tL)L i'/(l  +tK)Ki]"ea  (B7)
The unit convention  thus implies  that the value of factor use equals the number of units
of each factor. We therefore obtain  Lj  and K; from the social accounting  matrix (SAM), and
tL and  tK  are also computed using the SAM.  Given exogenous  values of the elasticity of
substitution  between  Kj and L, (a,), all the information  required to calculate  8b from equation
(B7) is available.
Once a, and 6,,  are known  for each industry, y,, can be calculated  using the zero profit
condition:
7rL Lj  +  r,  Kj=VAj  (B8)
But since  rL  and 7rk  are set to one in the benchmark,
(I +tL  )Lj  + ( 1  +tK)Kj  (B9)
+  (I
Similar procedures can be employed at the other levels of nesting on the production
side of the model, and on the demand side to determine  parameters of preference functions.86
Appendix C
Glossary of Notation  Used in Model Description
1.  Production
Qj  : output of sector  j
Auj  : intermediate  inputs of good i used by sector  j
ADj:  domestically  produced intermediate  inputs of good i used by sectorj
AMU:  imported intermediate  inputs of good i used by sector  j
amj  elasticity of substitution  between AD and AM in sector  j
bi  : distribution  parameter in the CES function for intermediate  inputs
a,j  : intermediate  input-output coefficient defining the requirement of input i per unit
output of sectorj
VAj  : value added in sector ]
V A  : efficiency parameter in VA  function for sectorj
X4  :input intensity of factor k in sectorj  in VA  function
a1 j  :elasticity of substitution  between factors k in jth sector
Lj  : labor use in sectorj,  in service units
K,  capital use in sectorj,  in service units
f,V  :use  of the factor k to produce a unit of output in sector  j
t,  :ad valorem tax rate levied on capital in sectorj
tL,  :ad  valorem fax rate levied on labor in sectorj
7rk  net-of-tax price received by owners of factor kPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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